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Mark A. Graber* 
The conventional constitutional canon and constitutional anticanon 
promote courts as powerful institutions.  Decisions are canonical or 
anticanonical because they matter.  Opinions do not make the constitu-
tional canon simply because they are well written, contain quotable 
phrases, or are particularly good examples of the legal craft.  For all 
most law professors and practitioners know, some opinion by Justice 
Samuel Blatchford selected at random from the 125th volume of the 
United States Reports meets those standards.  That decision is never-
theless neither canonical nor, if particularly poorly written, unquota-
ble, or badly reasoned, anticanonical. Justice Blatchford is conspicu-
ously absent from the constitutional canon and anticanon because no 
opinion he wrote influenced the course of American constitutional de-
velopment or plays a role in contemporary constitutional understand-
ings. 
Law professors and legal activists celebrate canonical judicial deci-
sions and condemn anticanonical judicial decisions for their effect on 
the American constitutional regime.  Brown v. Board of Education1 is 
routinely given credit for the destruction of Jim Crow.  Judge J. 
Harvie Wilkinson III asserts, “Brown may be the most important polit-
ical, social, and legal event in America’s twentieth-century history.  Its 
greatness lay in the enormity of injustice it condemned, in the en-
trenched sentiment it challenged, in the immensity of law it both cre-
ated and overthrew.”2  Dred Scott v. Sandford,3 “the most disastrous 
opinion the Supreme Court has ever issued,”4 is routinely blamed for 
the secession crisis and the military conflict that killed two percent of 
the American population.  Professor Cass Sunstein states, “the Court’s 
decision was a disaster, helping to fuel the Civil War.”5
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Professor Jamal Greene’s wonderful article, The Anticanon6 is in 
this tradition.  The essay demonstrates that we condemn “bad” judicial 
decisions for what we believe they did, not because they were particu-
larly incompetent judicial performances.  “[E]ach case” in the 
anticanon, Greene details, “has come to symbolize a set of generalized 
ethical propositions that we have collectively renounced.”7  Neverthe-
less, as do studies of the constitutional canon,8 Greene confines his 
anticanon to judicial cases.  His interest is in “identifying the Supreme 
Court’s worst decisions.”9
This brief note calls on students of American constitutionalism to 
add constitutional decisions made by elected officials to the constitu-
tional canon and the constitutional anticanon.  Neither the canonical 
nor the anticanonical constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court 
have produced the wonderful results or horrible evils sometimes at-
tributed to them.  In many cases, elected officials made cotemporane-
ous constitutional decisions that had as much influence as the celebrat-
ed or condemned judicial rulings.  More often than not, judicial 
rulings matter by changing the political dynamics than by directly 
changing public policy.  Law students and others interested in consti-
tutional change, for these reasons, need to explore the interactions be-
tween constitutional decisions inside and outside of courts, and not be 
exposed to a curriculum that consists of little more than good or bad 
judicial solos. 
  By constructing an anticanon composed en-
tirely of judicial decisions, The Anticanon risks contributing toward 
the conventional understanding that the Supreme Court has power to 
do great good and great evil. 
I.  CANONICAL CASES AND JUDICIAL POWER 
The most celebrated and most reviled Supreme Court decisions in 
American history may have had far less impact on constitutional de-
velopment than their canonical or anticanonical status might lead one 
to believe.  Professor Gerald Rosenberg in The Hollow Hope insists 
that Brown had almost no impact on school desegregation.  “[A] closer 
examination,” he details, “reveals that before Congress and the execu-
tive branch acted, courts had virtually no direct effect on ending dis-
crimination in the key fields of education, voting, transportation, ac-
commodations and public places, and housing.  Courageous and 
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praiseworthy decisions were rendered, and nothing changed.”10  Dred 
Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil maintains that Dred 
Scott, if anything, made the Civil War less likely.  That text claims, 
“the historical evidence suggests that Dred Scott did not further desta-
bilize, and may have temporarily preserved the antebellum political 
regime.  The decisions most responsible for the Civil War were made 
by those political actors whom institutionalist dogma entrusts with the 
authority to reach compromises on divisive political issues.”11
The impact of other canonical and anticanonical decisions on 
American constitutional development appears to be similarly exagger-
ated.  Such Warren Court landmarks as Reynolds v. Sims
 
12 and Mapp 
v. Ohio,13 The Hollow Hope documents, had far less influence on elec-
toral and political practices than a close reading of the opinions might 
indicate.14  The ink was hardly dry on Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland15 when a series of presidential ve-
toes killed the national bank and other related exercises of national 
power apparently sanctioned by judicial opinion.16
If the judicial canon is characterized by “hollow hopes,” the 
anticanon is distinguished by exaggerated fears.  Consider the three 
judicial rulings that Greene maintains, along with Dred Scott, consti-
tute the anticanon.  Lochner v. New York
 
17 had only a limited impact 
on progressive legislation at the turn of the twentieth century.  Most 
state legislative efforts to regulate hours and working conditions sur-
vived constitutional attack, including measures quite similar to those 
at issue in Lochner.18  Professor Robert McCloskey observes, “the ac-
tual negative decisions of importance were few, and the march toward 
regulation [was] at most deflected slightly and, here and there, some-
what delayed.”19  Immediately after Franklin Roosevelt became Presi-
dent, the Supreme Court more aggressively struck down bolder federal 
efforts to regulate contractual relationships,20
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quickly “persuaded” to change course.21  The significance of Plessy v. 
Ferguson22 pales by comparison to the congressional failure to pass the 
Lodge Elections Bill in 1890, which would have dramatically increased 
federal oversight of Southern elections, the congressional decision after 
the 1892 national election to repeal many Reconstruction election laws, 
and the turn of the twentieth century Southern conventions that in-
scribed white supremacy into state constitutions.23  The internment of 
Japanese-Americans came to be regarded as a national embarrassment 
almost immediately after Korematsu v. United States24 was handed 
down.  Today, that decision is cited only for the proposition that racial 
classifications must be strictly scrutinized.25
Elected officials made the constitutional decisions directly respon-
sible for the beneficent and disastrous results commonly credited to 
canonical and anticanonical judicial decisions.  The Civil Rights Act of 
1964 desegregated public education in the Deep South.  By cutting off 
federal funds to segregated school districts and authorizing the Justice 
Department to challenge segregated schools, Congress provided the 
civil rights community with the resources and Southern school districts 
with the incentives necessary to eradicate Jim Crow.  Rosenberg de-
clares, “when the federal government made money available to local 
school districts that desegregated, it loosed a powerful and attractive 
force on segregated schools.”
 
26  President Buchanan’s decision to sup-
port the pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution was responsible for creat-
ing the sectional schism within the Democratic Party that eventually 
destroyed the Union.  By aggressively championing a pro-slavery con-
stitution in a territory with an anti-slavery majority, Buchanan cut the 
ground underneath those Northern moderates willing to compromise 
with the South on slavery issues.  “The decisions most responsible for 
the Civil War,” I have detailed elsewhere, “the passage of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, the submission of the Lecompton Constitution, and the 
demand that the 1860 Democratic national convention endorse territo-
rial slave codes, were all made without judicial participation.”27
The impact of canonical and anticanonical decisions is more often 
indirect and unanticipated.  Brown did not immediately desegregate 
schools.  Slaveholders did not flood the territories after Dred Scott.  
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 22 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 23 See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Plessey Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303. 
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Instead, the course of American constitutional politics reflects the ways 
in which elected officials and political movements adjust to the possi-
bilities and challenges created by the judicial ruling.  Professor Mi-
chael Klarman’s backlash thesis maintains that Brown initially em-
powered the most reactionary forces in the South and that their 
repressive behavior, in turn, decisively turned Northern opinion 
against Jim Crow.  Klarman states: 
Brown was indirectly responsible for the landmark civil rights leg-
islation of the mid-1960s by catalyzing southern resistance to racial 
change.  Brown propelled southern politics far to the right, as race was 
exalted over all other issues.  In this political environment, men were 
elected to all levels of public office who were, both by personal predis-
position and political calculation, prepared to use virtually any means 
of resisting racial change, including blatant defiance of federal authori-
ty and brutal suppression of civil rights demonstrations.  The predict-
able consequence was a series of violent confrontations between white 
supremacist law enforcement officials and generally nonviolent de-
monstrators, which provoked an outcry from national television audi-
ences, leading Congress and the President to intervene with landmark 
civil rights legislation.28
The Lecompton Constitution caused the schism between Stephen 
Douglas and most Southern Democrats, but Dred Scott influenced 
how Southern Democrats sought to deny Douglas the Democratic Par-
ty presidential nomination in 1860.  Southern Jacksonians first insisted 
that Democrats implement Dred Scott by enacting a slave code in the 
territories and then walked out of the Democratic Party’s national 
convention when that demand was rebuffed.
 
29
II.  TOWARD A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PEDAGOGY 
 
Law professors who place canonical and anticanonical judicial rul-
ings alongside constitutional decisions made by elected officials pro-
vide students with a more sophisticated account of how Supreme 
Court decisions have influenced constitutional development and the 
structure of contemporary constitutional conflicts.  Contrary to much 
legal orthodoxy, the Supreme Court almost never engages in creation 
ex nihilo or single-handedly destroys entrenched constitutional practic-
es.  Some canonical and anticanonical decisions buttress legal founda-
tions constructed by other constitutional decisionmakers.  Plessy v. 
Ferguson and McCulloch v. Maryland built on the constitutional deci-
sions made outside the Court that promoted white supremacy and in-
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 28 Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 
7, 85 (1994). 
 29 2 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION 297–305 (2007). 
  
38 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 125:33 
corporated the National Bank of the United States.  Other judicial rul-
ings help demolish constitutional practices already severely weakened 
by attacks outside of the courts.  Giles v. Harris30 brought to an end 
post-Reconstruction efforts to give freed slaves the ballot.  Lawrence v. 
Texas31
A constitutional canon and anticanon that emphasize constitutional 
decisions or events that influenced the course of American constitu-
tional development or shaped contemporary understandings of the 
constitutional regime must range far beyond Supreme Court rulings.  
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ought 
to share the place of honor in the constitutional canon with Brown.   
The decision to foist a pro-slavery constitution on Kansas is as much a 
part of the anticanon as Dred Scott.  Indeed, a properly constructed 
canon includes constitutional decisions or events that took place almost 
entirely out of court.  The constitutional debates over the Louisiana 
Purchase and the annexation of Texas are canonical (or anticanonical), 
even though no Justice handed down a ruling establishing either the 
conditions under which the United States could acquire new territory 
or whether Congress by joint resolution could annex a foreign country. 
 sounded the death knell for contemporary efforts to criminalize 
homosexuality.  More often, judicial decisions alter the terrain on 
which constitutional struggles are fought without ensuring the ultimate 
victory of one side or the other.  Brown and Dred Scott foreclosed 
some political options while opening others.  The Civil War and the 
defeat of Jim Crow were consequences of the contingent choices politi-
cal actors made in those revised political circumstances, not the inevi-
table results of judicial decisions. 
No good reason exists for confining the constitutional canon in law 
schools to judicial decisions.  Lawyers are interested in securing relief 
for their clients, whether those clients represent individual interests or 
such broader political causes as racial equality.  A constitutional canon 
that implies that judicial decisions alone have the capacity to cause 
civil wars or eradicate a racial caste system may cause attorneys to fo-
cus exclusively on securing good language in legal opinions rather than 
on the impact of those decisions on the ground.  The struggles over the 
ratification of the Lecompton Constitution had more impact on the 
status of slavery in the Kansas Territory than the Dred Scott litigation.  
Desegregating schools proved far more difficult than securing favora-
ble judicial decisions.  The constitutional canon and anticanon we 
teach should also be more sensitive to the likely employment history of 
many law students.  Far more lawyers debated and drafted civil rights 
statutes or laws concerning the status of slavery in the territories than 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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participated in Brown v. Board of Education or Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford.  If one of our students produces a canonical or anticanonical de-
cision in the future, he or she is as likely to do so as a lawyer with the 
Office of Legal Counsel as he or she is as a Justice on the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
